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EU, and inappropriate economic policies. 
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Southeast Europe (SEE) is a region where the transition to a market economy and 
multiparty democracy has evolved under particularly difficult conditions. In comparison 
with the more advanced countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), most SEE 
countries today are lagging behind in their level of economic development, economic 
and institutional reforms, and integration with the European Union (EU). In this paper, 
the SEE region is considered in its narrow definition of the Western Balkan states— 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo under the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (the last three were part of the same country until June 2006).1 In 
discussing the initial conditions of 1989, however, reference will also be made to the 
other three countries in the SEE region—Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia.2  
The paper analyses the 20-year experience with transition in the SEE countries in a 
comparative framework, illustrating how these countries—most of which had some of 
the best starting conditions in 1989 for implementing a swift transition to a market 
economy—encountered difficulties in its implementation. The paper first recalls the 
initial conditions in the SEE region in 1989 (section 2). It proceeds to analyse 
macroeconomic performance of the SEE countries (section 3) and the progress achieved 
in the various transition-related economic and institutional reforms (section 4). 
International issues are also addressed, related to the post-2000 integration of the SEE 
countries with the EU and among themselves (section 5). The paper ends by reflecting 
on the principal factors that are responsible for delays in transition in SEE (section 6). A 
few concluding remarks are drawn at the end (section 7). 
2  Historical background: initial conditions in SEE 
When the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, the SEE region consisted of four 
countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and the Socialist Federal Republic (SFR) of 
Yugoslavia. All four countries started implementing transition-related economic 
reforms and held their first democratic multiparty elections in 1989-90, in SFR 
Yugoslavia at the level of the single republics. At that time, the general situation in SEE 
was very different from what it is today.  
In 1989, SFR Yugoslavia was the most developed and largest country in SEE, both in 
terms of territory and population. There were major differences among the SEE 
countries regarding their international relations and trade orientation (Uvalic 2001). 
                                                 
1   The Federal Republic (FR) of Yugoslavia was constituted in April 1992 and consisted of Serbia with 
its two provinces, Voivodina and Kosovo, and Montenegro. The country changed its name to the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro on 4 February 2003. Following the May 2006 referendum on 
independence in Montenegro, Serbia and Montenegro became two independent states in mid-June 
2006. According to the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 adopted in mid-1999 Kosovo officially 
remained part of Serbia, though thereafter it has effectively been governed by UNMIK. In February 
2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence, but at the time of writing has still not been 
recognized by the United Nations and three EU member states (Cyprus, Romania and Spain). All 
statistical data after 1999 on FR Yugoslavia/Serbia do not include Kosovo. 
2   Although Slovenia is more frequently classified among the CEE countries, since it was part of the 
Yugoslav federation it is appropriate to consider it as well.   
2 
SFR Yugoslavia in the late 1980s traded mainly with the European Community (EC), as 
it was not a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and had 
concluded several trade agreements with the EC, the first dating back to the early 1970s 
(Uvalic 1992). Bulgaria and Romania had been members of the CMEA for several 
decades, which naturally determined their main trade orientation in line with the 
‘socialist division of labour’, and therefore had a much higher proportion of trade with 
the other socialist countries. Albania was the most closed economy in Europe: after 
having abandoned the  CMEA in the early 1960s, it had followed its own autarkic 
development strategy for many years and had limited economic links with the rest of the 
world, including its closest neighbours.  
In 1989 the institutional framework in the SEE countries was also very different. In 
comparison with other communist countries, SFR Yugoslavia had a longer tradition 
with market-oriented economic reforms, which started already in the early 1950s. A 
unique system of workers’ self-management was introduced, along with opening up to 
the outside world and the gradual decentralization of the economy, particularly in the 
1970s. Nevertheless, also in Yugoslavia, some of the main features of the communist 
economic system were not abandoned until the late 1980s (Uvalic 1992), including the 
commitment to non-private property and ‘state paternalism’ (Kornai 1980).3  
More radical economic reforms, also in SFR Yugoslavia, started only at the end of the 
1980s. The amendments to the Constitution adopted in 1988 raised the limits on private 
property and encouraged foreign direct investment. In December 1989, the last 
Yugoslav government launched a bold macroeconomic stabilization programme based 
on the ‘shock therapy’ (the first of this kind),4 together with a privatization law aimed at 
changing the property regime in the bulk of the economy. The stabilization programme 
was initially successful in halting inflation, but by mid-1990 the mounting political 
crisis, which led soon after to Yugoslavia’s break-up, impeded its further 
implementation. 
In 1989, therefore, the overall initial conditions in SFR Yugoslavia were somewhat 
different than in the other former communist countries, primarily due to its longer 
experience with market-oriented economic reforms, greater openness of its economy 
and the country’s specific international relations. At the time of the break-up of 
Yugoslavia in mid-June 1991, all its successor states generally had less distorted 
economies than the centrally planned economies in CEE (Estrin and Uvalic 2008). 
Unlike the Yugoslav successor states that in 1991 inherited some elements of the market 
mechanism, there had been no previous experience of a market economy in Albania; 
Romania had one of the most centralized economies among all CMEA countries, while 
only very limited reforms had been implemented in Bulgaria.  
                                                 
3   Kornai (1980) uses the term ‘state paternalism’ to describe one of the most fundamental features of 
the socialist system, namely the paternalistic relationship between the state and the firm, whereby the 
firm is constantly protected and supported by the state. State paternalism is at the basis of ‘soft-budget 
constraints’, typical of the traditional socialist economy, namely soft terms set in the tax and credit 
system and toleration by the political authorities of enterprise financial indiscipline (see Kornai 1980).   
4   As a response to hyperinflation, the ‘shock therapy’ was based on the pegging of the exchange rate to 
the German mark, introduction of resident convertibility, freezing of money wages, strict monetary 
control, liberalization of 75 per cent of prices (except for public utilities, some metals and 
pharmaceuticals) and liberalization of 95 per cent of imports.  
3 
Kekic (1996) has calculated an index of initial conditions in all communist countries in 
1989, based on various economic indicators and institutional characteristics (including 
the extent of previous market-based economic reforms, exports to the CMEA, external 
debt, energy intensity, economic structure, etc.). The index suggests that all the 
Yugoslav republics had better overall conditions than the other SEE (but also many 
CEE) countries. The index of initial conditions was lower for Bulgaria (13), Albania 
(15) and Romania (15) than for the Yugoslav republics, where it ranged from 19 for 
Serbia and Montenegro to 24 for Slovenia. 
The economic transition in the SEE region was interrupted by the disintegration of the 
Yugoslav federation in mid-1991 into five independent states: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Slovenia and FR Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Serbia, with 
its two provinces Kosovo and Voivodina). After 1991, there was a notable divergence in 
the transition paths of the single countries, with some countries progressing much faster 
than others.  
Slovenia has had a much smoother transition than the other countries. It was the most 
developed post-communist country with probably the best overall starting conditions, 
and it was only briefly involved in the Balkan military conflicts.5 Soon after its 
independence in June 1991, Slovenia implemented major transition-related economic 
reforms, and was able to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union in 
1996, to benefit from the PHARE programme and later from pre-accession funds, which 
prepared the ground for its entry into the EU in May 2004, together with the other seven 
CEE countries.  
Bulgaria and Romania have had a slower pace of economic transition and have 
experienced major economic instability. Both countries went through a severe economic 
crisis also in the second half of the 1990s, which brought negative growth in Romania 
during 1997-99 and in Bulgaria during 1996-97. Nevertheless, similarly to Slovenia, 
they were able to benefit from EU support from the early 1990s. Bulgaria and Romania 
signed Association Agreements with the EU already in 1993, and benefited from 
PHARE and substantial pre-accession funding, which facilitated their joining the EU in 
January 2007. 
The remaining SEE countries—or the Western Balkan states—have encountered much 
greater problems. The extreme political instability in the SEE region, which affected 
most countries for more than a decade, has left very profound and long-lasting 
economic consequences. The disintegration of the Yugoslav federation in mid-1991 and 
the military conflicts that accompanied it—in Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1990-91), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-95), Kosovo (1998-99) and FYR Macedonia (2001); the 
pursue of nationalistic and inward-oriented policies by the newly created states; the 
authoritarian regimes in some key SEE countries like FR Yugoslavia and Croatia; the 
eleven weeks NATO bombing of FR Yugoslavia in 1999; the severe UN sanctions 
against FR Yugoslavia during most of the decade; the Greek embargo against FYR 
Macedonia—are among the factors that have very negatively influenced economic 
performance of most SEE countries. The political events of the 1990s have also 
postponed many of the economic reforms required for the transition to market economy. 
                                                 
5   After Slovenia declared independence in June 1991, the Yugoslav army intervened to defend 
Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, but it withdrew after just ten days.  
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The way the legacies of the previous economic system were dealt with after the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia has had a fundamental impact on the course of the 
transition and economic performance of its successor states, resulting in very different 
outcomes (Estrin and Uvalic 2008). 
As a result of unsettled political questions and/or postponed transition, these SEE 
countries have also substantially delayed their integration with the EU. It was only after 
the end of the Kosovo war in mid-1999 that the EU elaborated a more coherent and 
longer-term strategy for the integration of the Western Balkan states into the EU (see 
section 5 below).  
3  Macroeconomic performance of the Southeast European countries 
3.1  From hyperinflation to economic stabilization 
The initial measures of transition, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, had a number of 
negative economic consequences also in the SEE countries: high inflation, a substantial 
fall in real GDP, a rise in unemployment and worsening of other social indicators. In the 
SEE region, however, most of these problems have been of much greater scope than in 
the CEE countries, primarily because of the negative effects of the break-up of the 
Yugoslav federation, the military conflicts that accompanied it, and the United Nations 
embargo in the case of FR Yugoslavia (Uvalic 2003a).  
Table 1 
Inflation in SEE countries, 1992-2008 




















































































































1992 226.0    73.1  7,461  665.5 1,664.4  9,237.0        
1993 85.0    44,069  2,233  1,517.5  338.4  116.5 trillion       
1994 22.6    780.0  1,061  97.6 126.5  3.3        
1995 7.8   -4.4  12.9  2.0  16.4  78.6       
1996 12.7    -24.5  16.9 3.5 2.3  94.3       
1997 33.2    14.0  -7.3 3.6 2.6  21.3 18.3  23.4    
1998 20.6    5.1  -14.0 5.7  -0.1 29.5 30.0  32.4     
1999 0.4   -0.9  14.1  4.0  -0.7  37.1 41.1  67.6     
2000 0.1   1.9  14.0  4.6  5.8 60.4 70.0  97.1     
2001 3.1  3.2  1.9  7.0  3.8 5.5  91.3 91.8  22.6  11.7 
2002 5.2  0.4  -0.2  1.7  1.7 1.8  21.4 19.5  16.0  3.6 
2003 2.4  0.6  0.1  1.8  1.8 1.2  11.3 11.7  6.7  1.2 
2004 2.9  0.4  -0.3  1.9  2.1  -0.4 8.5 10.1  2.4  -1.1 
2005 2.4  3.8  3.0  5.2  3.3  0.5 14.1 16.5  2.3  -1.4 
2006 2.4  6.1  6.0  6.4  3.2 3.2  11.4 12.7  3.0  0.6 
2007  2.9 4.9  1.9 1.1  2.9  2.3  - 6.7 4.2  4.4 
2008 est.  3.4  8.5  8.5  8.0  6.1 8.3  - 11.7  7.4  9.4 
Source: EBRD (various years) for all except Kosovo: Commission of the EU (2006) and (2009b).  
5 
In the early 1990s, all SEE countries except Albania registered hyperinflation (see 
Table  1). The successor states of former Yugoslavia experienced extreme 
macroeconomic instability as a consequence of the break-up of the Yugoslav political, 
economic and monetary union, further fuelled by expansionary economic policies and 
other country-specific factors.  
Macroeconomic stabilization was attained the earliest in Croatia and FYR Macedonia. 
Thanks to very restrictive monetary policies, these two countries reduced inflationary 
pressures already in 1995-96. Thereafter, both countries continued applying restrictive 
monetary policy, Macedonia with the help of an IMF stand-by arrangement, which 
assured inflation rates usually well below 5 per cent. Macedonia even had disinflation in 
1998-99 and again in 2004.  
In Albania, the government introduced radical economic reforms in 1992, which were 
based on a shock therapy stabilization programme and backed by an IMF stand-by 
arrangement (Bartlett 2008: 31). Although inflation was brought down to a one-digit 
rate in 1995, the positive trend was interrupted by the 1997 financial crisis caused by 
pyramid schemes which deprived the Albanian population of life-long savings. Only 
after 1999 has Albania had a low inflation rate, usually well below 5 per cent.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced hyperinflation in the years immediately after the 
break-up of the Yugoslav federation and the war on its territory in 1992-95. A currency 
board was introduced in 1997 to facilitate monetary stability, with variable results for 
the two entities. In the Federation, inflation after 1995 has occasionally even been 
negative, but in the Republika Srpska, a one-digit inflation rate was achieved only after 
2001.  
The country that has had highest and longest inflationary pressures is FR Yugoslavia. In 
1993, FR Yugoslavia had one of the highest hyperinflations ever recorded in economic 
history (an average rate of 116.5 trillion per cent). The monetary reconstruction 
programme in January 1994 based on a currency board, implemented by Dragoslav 
Avramovic, the central bank governor, succeeded in bringing down inflation to 3.3 per 
cent in 1994. The currency board could not be maintained due to insufficient foreign 
reserves to back up monetary policies, which had already in mid-1994 become 
expansionary (Uvalic 2010). Moreover, in the absence of more fundamental systemic 
changes, inflation remained in double-digits also in the second half of the 1990s. It was 
only after political changes in October 2000 that radical economic reforms also brought 
more permanent macroeconomic stabilization. Although price liberalization led to an 
average inflation rate of over 90 per cent in 2001, inflation was gradually reduced 
thereafter.   
Within FR Yugoslavia, Serbia’s inflation rate has been similar to the one recorded for 
the whole country. After the split between Serbia and Montenegro in June 2006, 
inflation in Serbia has been at around 10 per cent or lower. In Montenegro, in order to 
escape from inflationary pressures within FR Yugoslavia, the government decided to 
introduce the German mark as legal tender already in 1998, which was replaced by the 
euro in 2002. This contributed to a substantial reduction of inflation, though only after 
2003. In Kosovo, where the euro has also been used as legal tender after mid-1999, 




Exchange rate regimes in the SEE countries 
Country  Exchange arrangement  Period of adoption  Currency 
Albania  Pegged  1990-91  Lek linked to the US$ 
 Independently  floating  1992  onwards  Lek 
      
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
No unique regime  1992-96  BiH dinar, new BiH dinar, Croatian 
dinar (later kuna), Republika Srpska 
dinar and Yugoslav dinar 
  BiH dinar pegged   After Aug. 1994   
  Currency board  1997 onwards  Convertible marka linked to the euro 
      
Croatia  Pegged  1992  Croatian dinar, in 1993 replaced by 
the kuna 
  Managed float  Oct. 1993 onwards   
      
FYR 
Macedonia 
Pegged  1992-95  Coupons, later replaced by the 
Macedonian denar 
  Conventional peg  1995 onwards  Macedonian denar 
      
FR Yugoslavia  Pegged  1992-99  Yugoslav dinar  
 – Serbia  Pegged  1992  Yugoslav dinar  
  Managed float  Dec. 2000   
 – Montenegro  Euroization (euro de jure 
legal tender) 
1998 onwards  Euro 
 – Kosovo  Euroization (euro de jure 
legal tender) 
Mid-1999 onwards  Euro 
Source:  Daviddi and Uvalic (2006). 
Table 3 






















































































1995    -10.1 -0.3 -0.7 -1.0 -4.3         
1996    -9.7 -3.9 -0.4 -1.4 -3.8         
1997    -12.7 -0.4 -1.1 -0.4 -7.6         
1998    -12.1 -0.1 -3.0 -1.7 -5.4         
1999    -12.3 -4.0 -8.2  0.0 NA         
2000    -7.6 -4.7 -7.5  2.5 -0.9 -0.09  -4.0     
2001    -6.9 2.2  -6.8  -6.3  -1.3 -6.3  -2.0  3.7 
2002    -6.1 -4.2 -4.9 -5.7 -4.5 -3.2  -1.9  4.4 
2003    -4.9 2.3  -4.8  -0.6  -4.2 -1.1  -3.1  2.1 
2004    -5.1 1.6  -4.0 0.4  -3.4 0.9 -1.9 -4.5 
2005    -3.5  2.2 -3.5  0.3  0.9 1.0  2.1 -3.0 
2006    -3.3 2.2  -3.1  -0.3 2.3  -1.6 4.2 2.4 
2007    -3.5 -0.1 -2.5  0.6  - -1.9 6.4 7.0 
2008 est.    -5.7 -3.0 -1.4 -1.5  - -2.4 1.5 0.0 
Source: EBRD (various years) for all except Kosovo: Commission of the EU (2006) and (2009b). 
 
The SEE countries have adopted a variety of exchange rate regimes in order to sustain 
their macroeconomic stabilization efforts, from floating regimes to much more rigid  
7 
arrangements (see Table 2). Still, the choice of an exchange rate regime does not seem 
to have fundamentally influenced actual monetary policy. Even in countries with more 
flexible exchange rate regimes (Albania, Croatia, or Serbia), the objective of low 
inflation has led to restrictive monetary policies and real appreciation of national 
currencies, bearing close similarities with policies followed by countries under a more 
rigid regime—the currency board in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the adoption of the 
euro in Montenegro and Kosovo (Daviddi and Uvalic 2006). 
High fiscal deficits were characteristic of the 1990s, but there has been some fiscal 
consolidation after 2001 (see Table 3). Restrictive budgetary policies have led to fiscal 
surpluses, frequently for several years in a row—in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 
2003-06, in FYR Macedonia in 2004-05 and again in 2007, in Montenegro throughout 
the 2005-08 period, in Serbia in 2004-05, in Kosovo in 2001-03 and in 2006-08. While 
the tax systems in all SEE countries have been subject to radical reforms, the structure 
of government expenditure has not changed much, confined to a large extent to wages, 
pensions and social transfers, with negligible capital investment. In 2008, the share of 
government expenditure in GDP was considered high particularly in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (48 per cent), Montenegro (44 per cent), Serbia (40 per cent) and Croatia 
(39 per cent). The size of the government is smaller in Albania and FYR Macedonia, 
where public expenditure in 2008 accounted for only 27 per cent and 34 per cent of their 
respective GDPs. 
By 2009, therefore, all the SEE countries had reached substantial monetary stability, 
though at different times—Croatia and FYR Macedonia earliest, while Serbia only 
recently. The conduct of monetary policy has been heavily constrained by the 
requirements of macroeconomic stabilization, in almost all cases codified in 
conditionality negotiated and agreed with the IMF. Macroeconomic stability has been 
supported by more restrictive budgetary policy, although weak tax collection and a large 
informal economy remain characteristic. If not addressed in a coherent way, fiscal 
problems could endanger longer-term stability (see Trumbic and Uvalic 2005).   
3.2  From a deep recession towards economic recovery 
The SEE countries went through a very deep recession in the early 1990s (see Table 4). 
Albania registered a strong drop in real GDP in 1991-92, but in 1993 it had a growth 
rate close to 10 per cent. In Yugoslavia, the economic reforms implemented by the last 
government in 1990-91 led to a strong fall in output, while the dissolution of the country 
further deepened its economic collapse (Bartlett 2008: 114). Consequently, the 
Yugoslav successor states registered a much stronger cumulative fall of output. During 
only three years, from 1991 to 1993, real GDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina fell by 12 per 
cent, 80 per cent and 10 per cent respectively, while dropping in FR Yugoslavia by 12 
per cent, 28 per cent and 31 per cent. Industrial production fell even more, contributing 
to a rapid process of de-industrialization. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the war brought a 
complete collapse of industrial capacity, in FR Yugoslavia the fall in industrial 
production was particularly hit by the introduction of UN sanctions in May 1992, but 
Albania suffered the most damaging transition shock. The Albanian government never 
managed to introduce effective structural policies capable of rebuilding the industrial 
capacity that had been lost in the 1990s by the decline of the old state-owned industries 
(Bartlett 2008: 120-1).   
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Table 4 



















































































































1990  -10.0  -23.2 -7.1 -9.9 -7.9           
1991  -28.0 -12.1 -21.1  -7.0 -11.6        -7.9 
1992  -7.2 -80.0 -11.7  -8.0 -27.9        -9.2 
1993 9.6  -10.0  -8.0  -9.1  -30.8        -4.9 
1994  8.3 0.0 5.9  -1.8 2.5 2.5 0.7    -5.2 
1995 13.3  20.8  6.8  -1.1 6.1 6.1 6.2    0.1 
1996  9.1  86.0 5.9 1.2 7.8 7.8  13.9    0.2 
1997  -10.9  37.0 6.8 1.4 10.1 10.1  4.2    3.5 
1998  8.6  15.6 2.1 3.4 1.9 1.9 4.0    -0.1 
1999 13.2  9.6  -1.5  4.3  -18.0 -18.0  -6.7    1.8 
2000  6.5 5.5 3.0 4.5 5.0 5.2 3.1    6.3 
2001  7.9 4.3 3.8  -4.5 5.5 5.1 1.1    1.8 
2002  4.2 5.5 5.4 0.9 4.0 4.5 1.9  -2.4 4.5 
2003  5.8 3.0 5.0 2.8 3.0 2.4 2.5  -0.1 5.8 
2004  5.7 6.3 4.2 4.1 5.0 9.3 4.4 3.4 7.2 
2005  5.7 3.9 4.2 4.1 5.0 6.3 4.2 3.8 6.3 
2006  5.4 6.7 4.7 4.0 5.0 5.5 8.6 3.9 7.2 
2007  6.0 6.8 5.5 5.9  -  6.9  10.7 5.0 7.0 
2008  est.  6.8 5.4 2.4 4.9  -  5.4 7.5 5.4 4.2 
GDP 2008 
(1989=100) 
163.0 84.0 111.0  102.0  NA 72.0  92.0 NA  140.0 
Source:   EBRD (various years) for all except Kosovo: Commission of the EU (2006) and (2009b). 
Economic recovery from the deep recession took place at different times—already in 
1993 in Albania, in 1994 in most other SEE countries, and only in 1996 in Macedonia, 
where the recession was milder but lasted longer. However, there was a reversal in the 
trend of economic recovery in the second half of the 1990s, for different reasons, in all 
countries except Bosnia and Herzegovina. Albania had a serious financial crisis in 1997 
caused by the collapse of pyramid schemes. Croatia also experienced a financial crisis 
when several domestic banks collapsed in 1998, due to politically connected lending to 
unprofitable enterprises (Bartlett 2008). FR Yugoslavia registered an 18 per cent fall in 
GDP in 1999, caused by the NATO bombing. FYR Macedonia’s economic recovery 
was interrupted in 2001 by the outbreak of civil war. 
After unsatisfactory growth during much of the 1990s, 2008 has been the eight 
consecutive year of positive real GDP growth for most countries, on average close to or 
over 5 per cent. The only exceptions are FYR Macedonia, experiencing negative growth 
in 2001 due to the civil war, and Kosovo, where positive GDP growth rates were 
registered only after 2004. Kosovo has had a very slow economic recovery due to 
reduced international assistance and the failure of the UNMIK authorities and the 
provisional government to implement effective economic reforms (Bartlett 2008: 
116-7). Strong domestic demand in recent years in the SEE countries has been fuelled 
by fast credit growth and by the revival of exports markets, contributing to their present 
high vulnerability to the 2008-09 global financial and economic crisis.    
9 
3.3  External imbalances and FDI 
All SEE countries presently face serious external imbalances. After a decade of 
declining or stagnating exports, caused by the break-up of the Yugoslav federation, 
military conflicts and trade embargos, SEE countries’ exports have been growing since 
2001. However, imports have grown even faster, inducing rising foreign trade deficits. 
Restrictive monetary policies implemented to combat inflation have frequently led to 
strong real appreciation of the national currencies, facilitating in no way the expansion 
of exports. Despite the trade preferences granted by the EU to all SEE countries after 
2000, many SEE products are not sufficiently competitive on foreign markets or face 
non-tariff barriers, limiting their capacity to increase exports further.  
The actual outcomes of macroeconomic policies, also in this respect, have been 
strikingly similar across the SEE countries. Countries with more flexible exchange rate 
regimes have not used exchange rate policy to stimulate exports, rather on the contrary, 
currency appreciation has constrained export growth and stimulated increasing imports. 
The export capacity has been even lower in countries with a currency board or the euro, 
also due to additional structural deficiencies and country-specific problems. The main 
consequence in all cases has been a substantial increase in the trade deficit.  
Due to an increasing trade deficit, all SEE countries have also had persistent current 
account deficits, which reached alarming levels in 2008 (see Figure 1). The high current 
account deficits have been covered by continuous inflows of capital from abroad—donors’ 
assistance, emigrants’ remittances, foreign loans, and foreign direct investment. By late 
2008, most SEE countries also had extremely high levels of gross external debt, 
particularly Croatia (88 per cent of GDP), Montenegro (77 per cent) and Serbia (63 per 
cent).  
Because of their large external financial needs, the SEE countries have been among the 
most exposed to the global credit crunch (see Uvalic 2009a). Several SEE countries turned 
to IMF for support late in 2008 and early 2009. IMF has already provided emergency 
loans to Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Croatia, Montenegro, and FYR 
Macedonia are expected to follow (see IHS Global Insight 2009).  
The high dependence of most SEE countries on foreign capital inflows is not of recent 
origin. In the 1990s, foreign assistance programmes helped economic recovery in   
 
Figure 1 
Current account deficits in the SEE, 2008 (in % of GDP) 








Source: IMF (2008).  
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Table 5 
Net inflows of FDI in SEE countries, 1989-2008 
(in millions US$) 
 Albania 
Bosnia &  
Herzegovina Croatia Macedonia  Montenegro Serbia   
Total FDI in 
SEE-6 
2000 143  146  1,105  175  NA  50  1,619 
2001 207  119  1,398  441  10  165  2,340 
2002 135  266  552  105  84  475  1,617 
2003 178  382  1,927  117  44  1,365  4,013 
2004 324  708  732  322  63  966  3,115 
2005 258  608  1,551  94  482  1,550  4,543 
2006  315  718  3,194 424 585  4,264  9,500 
2007  647  2,088  4,736 700 717  2,523  11,411 
2008  844  1,003  4,576 612 805  2,717  10,557 
      
Cumulative net inflows  1989-2008        
US$, million  3,505  6,228  23,164 3,226 2,791  15,040  53,954 
Per head US$  1,101  1,639  5,215 1,570 4,229  2,005  - 
      
FDI inflows 2008               
in % of GDP  6.6  5.3  6.6  6.4  16.7  5.3  - 
Source:  EBRD (various issues). 
Figure 2 
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Source:   EBRD. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and were accompanied by externally-imposed reform agendas 
and inappropriate aid policies. The phenomenon of ‘aid addiction’—transfers of large 
amounts of international resources without the creation of sound conditions for more 
permanent economic recovery and self-sustaining growth—became an acute problem 
particularly in the international protectorates: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (see 
Uvalic 2003b), but high dependence on external donor financial assistance was also  
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present in FR Yugoslavia after the 2000 political changes (see Uvalic 2010). 
Throughout the 1990s, international assistance programmes have contributed little to 
creating conditions for self-sustaining growth in SEE. Until 2000, the prevalent part of 
foreign aid in the Western Balkans was not used for productive investment, but for 
emergency programmes, humanitarian assistance, and food aid (see Uvalic 2001). 
Since 2001, the SEE countries have finally attracted increasing foreign direct 
investment (FDI), after a decade of extremely limited inflows. From 1989 to 1996, the 
cumulative FDI inflows into the four Western Balkan countries (without Bosnia) 
amounted to less than US$900 million, or 2 per cent of the total invested into the 27 
transition countries (Uvalic 2003a). Even after 1997, FDI in the Western Balkans 
remained low, representing only 6 per cent of FDI into all 27 transition economies over 
1989-2001. During this initial period, 60 per cent of total FDI in the Western Balkans 
was concentrated in Croatia. 
Along with political stabilization after 2001 and the new EU policy for the Western 
Balkans launched in mid-1999, FDI has steadily increased, particularly after 2006 (see 
Table 5 and Figure 2). In 2006 Serbia attracted a record FDI of over US$4 billion, 
thanks to a few major privatization deals in telecommunications and banking. The 
recent increase in FDI inflows demonstrates a substantial improvement with respect to 
the 1990s, but the cumulative FDI of some 54 billion into the six Western Balkan 
countries during 1989-2008 is still fairly low, around 8.2 per cent of the total invested 
into all transition countries. The limited entry of FDI into the Western Balkan countries 
until recently, prevalently concentrated in services, is one of the main reasons for the 
inadequate restructuring of basic industries.  
Over the whole 1989-2008 period, Croatia remained notably ahead of the other Western 
Balkan countries in terms of FDI stock, with US$23 billion, but this is still much less 
than the US$41 billion invested in Bulgaria or the US$58 billion invested in Romania. 
The second highest FDI stock is in Serbia (US$15 billion), followed by substantially 
lower amounts in Bosnia and Herzegovina (US$6.2 billion), Albania (US$3.5 billion), 
FYR Macedonia (US$3.2 billion) and Montenegro (US$2.8 billion). Regarding 
cumulative FDI inflows per capita, by 2008 Croatia was again ahead (US$5,215) 
followed by Montenegro (US$4,229), while the other SEE countries have attracted 
much less, ranging from US$1,100 in Albania to US$2,000 in Serbia.  
The high political risk deriving from the military conflicts in SEE has undoubtedly been 
the main barrier for more FDI inflows in the 1990s, but political factors also remained 
important after 2000. Kosovo has so far attracted very little FDI—some 750 million 
euros over the 2004-07 period (see Commission 2009a). Limited inflows of FDI also 
stem from the smallness of markets of most SEE countries, from uncertain prospects of 
EU membership, and from the unsatisfactory regulatory environment.  
3.4  Slow catching up and ‘jobless’ growth 
Despite strong growth in SEE in recent years, economic recovery has not been sufficient 
to compensate for the very substantial output drop of the 1990s. As late as 2005, 
Albania was the only SEE country that had surpassed its 1989 GDP level, thanks to 
exceptionally high growth rates throughout most of the 1990s and a very low starting 
point, while Croatia had just reached its 1989 GDP level. Although there was some  
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further catching-up, the situation is still unfavourable for most countries, especially in 
comparison to the other countries in the transition region. 
By 2008, the estimated real GDP in the nine more advanced countries (the five CEE 
countries, the three Baltics, and Croatia) was 156 per cent of the 1989 level. In all the 29 
EBRD countries it was 140 per cent, while the situation was considerably worse in most 
Western Balkan countries. Only Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia had surpassed their 
1989 GDP levels by 2008, while Montenegro was at 92 per cent, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina at 84 per cent, and Serbia at only 72 per cent of the GDP produced in 1989 
(see Table 4 and Figure 3). 
There are presently large differences among the SEE countries in the achieved level of 
economic development, larger than among the CEE countries (see Table 6). The richest 
country by far is Croatia, with a GDP per capita (at market exchange rates) in 2008 of 
over US$13,760; or of US$18,290 at purchasing power parity (PPP), according to 
estimates of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). If we consider GDP per capita at 
PPP, the second most developed country is Serbia, but if we consider market exchange 
rates, it is Montenegro. The poorer SEE countries are Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, while the poorest is Kosovo. The EU Commission data show that in 2005 
Kosovo had a GDP per capita of only €1,105 (at current prices), while it was €6,643 in 
Croatia (see Commission of the EC 2006). 
Some catching-up has taken place over the past eight years with respect to the EU 
average GDP per capita, both because growth in the SEE countries has generally been 
higher than in the EU, and because the EU average has been lowered somewhat after the  
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EU 2004-07 enlargements. In 2000, the SEE countries had a GDP per capita (at 
purchasing power standards, PPS) of only around 10-30 per cent of the EU-15 average 
(Uvalic 2003b). By 2008, Croatia had reached 63 per cent of the EU-27 GDP per head 
at PPS, but the other countries were still much further behind: Montenegro was at 43 per 
cent, Serbia at 36 per cent, Bosnia at 31 per cent and Albania at 26 per cent of the EU-
27 average (see Commission of the EU 2009c).  
Figure 4 
Levels of development of the SEE countries, 2005 and 2008 
AT MARKET EXCHANGE RATES 
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The present relatively low level of development of the SEE countries is also reflected in 
the structure of their economies. Only in Albania does agriculture still contribute an 
important proportion of gross value added (21 per cent in 2005). The other SEE countries 
are less agricultural-oriented, the relative share of agriculture in gross value added had 
declined by 2006 to 12 per cent in FRY Macedonia, 11 per cent in Kosovo, 10 per cent in 
both Montenegro and in Serbia, and 7 per cent in Croatia. During 2000-07, these changes 
were accompanied by a decline in the relative share of industry in all countries except 
Albania, as well as a very strong increase in the role of services. The process of de-
industrialization, which was most intense in the SEE countries in the early 1990s, has thus 
continued. By 2006-07, the contribution of services to gross value-added ranged from 57 
per cent in FYR Macedonia to 69 per cent in Serbia (Commission of the EC 2009a: 61-2). 
In comparison with the 71.6 per cent share of services in the EU-27 in 2007, the SEE 
countries’ shares seem rather high, considering their much lower level of economic 
development. Much of the recent growth in many SEE countries (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo) has taken place in non-exportable services 
such as retail trade, banking and telecommunications, and not in the tradeable goods 
sector, which further explains the poor export performance of the SEE region.  
The high GDP growth rates in most SEE countries have also been largely insufficient to 
alleviate the problem of very high unemployment.  Though all governments have 
undertaken measures to create new jobs for laid-off workers to stimulate private sector 
development and to facilitate the entry of new private firms, the SEE unemployment rates 
are the highest in Europe (see Figure 5). The SEE has been badly hit by the phenomenon 
of ‘jobless’ growth, similarly to CEE countries in the first years of transition, but its 
proportions in most SEE countries have been much greater and there are no signs of 
improvement. 
According to the more realistic labour force surveys (LFS), unemployment in SEE has 
also been extremely high, much higher than in CEE countries in the 1990s. The LFS 
unemployment rates in 2007 were particularly high in Bosnia and Herzegovina (29 per 
cent), FYR Macedonia (35 per cent), and Kosovo (44 per cent). Serbia and Montenegro 
have also had very high unemployment rates, close to 20 per cent or higher, which started 
declining in Serbia only in 2007. Also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia and 
Kosovo, unemployment rates have either increased or have remained very high over the 
last 5-6 years. Croatia is the only country that has rather substantially reduced its   
 
Table 6 
GDP per head in Southeast Europe, 2005 and 2008 (in US$) 
 
At market exchange 
rates 
At purchasing power 
parities 
GDP per capita in PPS
EU 27= 100 
  2005 2008  2005 2008  2006 2008 
Albania  2,690 4,260    5,400 6,920   23  26 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  2,850  4,660    6,610  8,650    27  31 
Croatia 9,970  13,760    14,940 18,290    57  63 
Macedonia  2,820 4,370    7,350 9,140   29  33 
Montenegro 3,480  7,850    7,880 10,800    36  43 
Serbia  3,500  6,880   8,620  11,160   33  36 
Source:   Estimates of the Economist Intelligence Unit (June 2009), except for the last two columns which 




Unemployment rates in southeast Europe (labour force surveys), in % of labour force 
Source:  Commission of the European Communities (2009a). 
unemployment rate, from 15 per cent in 2002 to less than 10 per cent in 2007. Under the 
impact of the current global economic crisis which has hit all SEE countries, 
unemployment is likely to increase further.  
These very high unemployment rates overestimate the effective number of unemployed 
workers, as they do not take into account persons having an activity in the informal 
economy. According to some estimates of the size of the informal economy in transition 
economies, in the SEE it is generally larger than in the CEE countries, ranging on 
average in 2002 from 32 per cent in Croatia to 45 per cent in Macedonia, but smaller 
than in many CIS countries (Schneider 2003). Other estimates suggest that the level of 
informal activity is the highest in Albania (52 per cent of household income), Kosovo 
and Macedonia (at 45 per cent and 39 per cent, respectively), while the Bosnian 
Federation, Serbia and Croatia have the lowest levels at 18-19 per cent (Bartlett 2008: 
125).  
4  Progress with transition-related economic and institutional reforms 
The economic and institutional reforms needed for the transition to market economy 
have proceeded at variable speed in the individual SEE countries, and were in some of 
the countries notably delayed by unfavourable political circumstances. Albania, Croatia, 
and FYR Macedonia have implemented most reforms at a faster pace than the other 
SEE countries, and therefore have been labelled as the ‘early reformers’ (Bartlett 2008). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo), in 
contrast, have postponed more radical economic reforms until fairly recently due to 
military conflicts and other political problems, and were thus referred to as the ‘late 
reformers’. FR Yugoslavia implemented radical economic reforms only after 2000, 
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scale privatization and price liberalization. Bosnia and Herzegovina still has problems 
linked to the fragility of its institutions and malfunctioning of the state administration. 
All the SEE countries have made substantial progress since 2001 in implementing the 
most important economic and institutional changes. We will consider the most recent 
transition indicators of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
which evaluate progress in various areas of economic reform in all 29 countries in 
transition, on the basis of scores ranging from 1 (no or limited reform) to 4+ (comparable 
to a developed market economy). Thanks to the accelerated economic reforms in both FR 
Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina over the last eight years, these two countries 
have also achieved excellent results in many areas of transition.  
The EBRD transition indicators for 2009 show that there are no longer extreme 
differences between the ‘early’ and the ‘late’ SEE reformers (see Table 7), as was the case 
in 2001. Moreover, there are no major differences between the results achieved in CEE 
and SEE with respect to some of the easier-to-implement reforms, such as price 
liberalization, reforms of the trade and foreign exchange systems, or small-scale 
privatization, since these reforms have been completed by now also in the SEE countries. 
All SEE countries have successfully implemented price liberalization and have opened up 
their economies through thorough reforms of the foreign trade regime, the elimination of 
quantitative restrictions and substantial lowering of tariff barriers. Small-scale 
privatization has also been practically completed in all countries except Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, whereas large-scale privatization, though slower, is well on its way in all the 
SEE countries (Albania is forging ahead of the other countries). In other areas, progress in 
the SEE countries has been slower. The most critical areas are enterprise governance 
and restructuring, competition policies, and the development of securities markets and 
non-bank institutions. In these three areas, far-reaching reforms have been much more 
difficult to implement, though these are the areas where changes have been more 
gradual also in the CEE countries.  
Table 7 








































































Private sector share of GDP (in %) mid-2009  75 60 70 70 65  60 
Enterprises          
– Large-scale privatization  4-↑ 3 3+ 3+ 3 ↓  3- 
– Small-scale privatization   4 3 4+ 4 4-  4- 
– Governance & enterprise restructuring  2+ 2 3 3- 2  2+ 
Markets  and  trade          
– Price liberalization  4+ 4 4 4+ 4  4 
– Trade and foreign exchange system   4+ 4 4+ 4+ 4  4 ↑ 
– Competition policy   2 2 3 ↑ 2+ 2 ↑   2 
Financial  institutions          
– Banking reform & interest rate liberalization  3  3  4  3  3  3 
– Securities markets & non-bank financial           
 institutions 
2- 2- 3 3- ↑ 2-  2 
Infrastructure reforms  2+ 2+ 3  2+ 2+ ↑  2+ 
Source: EBRD  (2009).  
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The private sector in 2009 accounted for 60-75 per cent of the SEE countries’ GDP. 
Albania is the most privatized SEE economy, with a 75 per cent share of the private sector 
in GDP. Private sector has grown the least in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where 
it contributes 60 per cent of GDP, thus placing these two countries among the six least 
privatized economies in the transition region. Privatization frequently has not been 
sufficient to improve corporate governance or lead to deep enterprise restructuring. In the 
privatized sector, microeconomic restructuring has often been delayed due to limited 
access to credit facilities and insufficient FDI in key industries, ineffective systems of 
corporate governance and lack of managerial skills. In many cases, enterprises were sold 
at privileged conditions to employed workers and managers, rather than outside owners or 
foreign investors having the resources and skills to invest in new technology and 
modernization. Enterprise restructuring and improved governance have taken place even 
to a lesser degree in the still non-privatized sector of the SEE economies, which is still 
fairly large in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.  
However, even less progress has been made in competition policy. Although most SEE 
countries have reduced subsidies to large non-privatized enterprises and have adopted 
laws promoting competition, there have been substantial delays in implementing existing 
legislation, the anti-trust authorities have been ineffective and monopolistic structures 
continue to dominate in a number of sectors. As a result, in the area of competition policy, 
all countries except Croatia were evaluated in 2009 by a modest score of 2 (with the 
addition of a plus or a minus). One of the main factors impeding more competition in all 
SEE countries is the inadequate regulatory business environment, also with regard to firm 
entry and exit. Although there have been major improvements in easing the conditions for 
firm entry, there are still substantial barriers in most SEE countries, as documented by the 
World Bank ‘Doing Business Surveys’.  
Another area where developments have been relatively slow is the financial sector. The 
SEE countries have implemented radical banking reforms, including privatization through 
the sale of majority shares to foreign banks, although with some delay in some countries 
like Serbia. By 2003, foreign ownership of the banking sector was already very high in 
Albania (over 95 per cent of total assets), Bosnia and Herzegovina (70 per cent) and 
Kosovo (61 per cent) (Commission of the EC 2004). In the meantime, foreign ownership 
of the banking sector has become dominant also in Serbia and Montenegro: in 2007, the 
asset share of foreign-owned banks in Montenegro was 79 per cent, and 75 per cent in 
Serbia (EBRD 2008: 162, 178). At the end of 2008, Serbia had only one bank 
(Komercijalna Banka) in which the Serbian government had a minority (43 per cent) 
ownership share (Uvalic 2010). Nevertheless, the loan-to-deposit ratios have generally 
been lower in the Western Balkans than in the CEE countries, while the net interest 
spread (the difference between lending and borrowing interest rates) is still relatively 
high, particularly in Serbia. Mainly as a consequence of delayed privatization, the stock 
exchange remains underdeveloped in all countries except Croatia, and little progress has 
been achieved in setting up non-bank financial institutions such as investment funds. 
Infrastructure is another area where the SEE countries are still lagging behind the CEE 
countries, since economic reforms started to be implemented only fairly recently. By 
2009, with the exception of only Croatia, the SEE countries were evaluated with a low 2 
or 2+. These, however, are difficult areas to reform, and reform has taken place very 
gradually also in the most developed market economies and sometimes not even very 
successfully.  
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Although the progress achieved in transition-related economic reforms within the SEE 
region has been variable, the differences today are much less pronounced than eight years 
ago. Croatia, so far, has achieved the best results, in most areas evaluated by the EBRD as 
well as—or even better—than Bulgaria and Romania. Although the other SEE countries 
are lagging behind, even the ‘slow’ reformers (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and 
Montenegro) have caught up in most areas of reform and are now approaching the more 
advanced countries. Thus there has been a major convergence among the SEE countries 
regarding their institutional framework.  
5  International integration of the SEE countries  
A decade of marked political and economic instability in the SEE region also delayed 
their economic integration with the outside world. The situation started to change after 
the end of the Kosovo conflict in mid-1999, when the EU launched the stabilization and 
association process (SAP) specifically for the Western Balkan countries. SAP included 
various measures to help the transition and integration of the SEE countries: generous 
trade preferences, the possibility to establish contractual relations with the EU through 
the signing of Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA), and a new programme 
of financial assistance. Even more important, the Western Balkan countries were 
offered the prospect of future EU membership for the very first time since 1989. At the 
same time, in June 1999, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was adopted by the 
EU and its member states, other developed countries and major international 
organizations, aimed at helping the economic reconstruction of the seven SEE countries 
affected by the 1999 military conflict, in addition to the then five Western Balkan 
countries, Bulgaria and Romania as well. 
Privileged access to EU markets was assured already in 2000, through EU autonomous 
trade measures which established a uniform system of trade preferences for all Western 
Balkan countries (FR Yugoslavia was included somewhat later, on 1 November 2000). 
These trade preferences provided for the elimination of duties and quantitative 
restrictions for approximately 95 per cent of the goods from the Western Balkans 
entering the EU market, including agricultural and sensitive industrial products, with 
only a few exceptions. Privileged access to EU markets is provided even before a 
country concludes a SAA. The SEE-EU trade liberalization process is being 
implemented on an asymmetric basis, initially envisaging a greater opening of EU 
markets than those of the SEE countries. The EU also adopted a new programme of 
financial assistance specifically for the Western Balkans: the Community Assistance to 
Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS), through which some 
€5 billion was to be provided over the 2000-06 period.  
At the EU-Balkan Summit in June 2003 in Thessaloniki, the prospects of EU 
membership for the Western Balkans were reconfirmed and further steps were 
undertaken to strengthen the EU-Balkan integration process. One of the novelties is the 
introduction of European partnerships for the Western Balkan countries to identify the 
main priorities and checklists (similar to the earlier partnerships designed for the CEE 
countries). A new instrument of financial assistance was also adopted in July 2006, the 
Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), to replace all previous financial 
assistance programmes. It is through the IPA programme that EU assistance is now 
delivered to candidate and potential candidate countries—not only to the Western  
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Balkans, but also Turkey and recently Iceland. The total pre-accession funding within 
IPA for the current EU financial framework (2007-13) is €11.5 billion. 
In the meantime, a more favourable climate was created also for increasing trade among 
the SEE countries. Thanks to the changed political climate after 2000, one of the most 
important regional cooperation initiatives of the Stability Pact for SEE is the process of 
trade liberalization. A Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Liberalization and 
Facilitation was signed on 27 June 2001 in Brussels by the foreign trade ministers of 
the-then seven SEE countries (the five Western Balkan countries plus Bulgaria and 
Romania); Kosovo participates as a separate entity, while Moldova has also joined the 
initiative in the meantime. The Memorandum led to the conclusion of bilateral free trade 
agreements (FTA) among the SEE countries, providing for a substantial reduction or 
elimination of tariff barriers. The process has effectively led to the creation of a free 
trade area in the SEE region (see Uvalic 2006; Bartlett 2007). After Bulgaria and 
Romania joined the EU early in 2007, EU trade regulations have superseded the FTAs 
signed with the other SEE countries.  
Since these bilateral FTAs have been criticized as representing a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of 
differentiated trade relations, another important agreement was concluded in Bucharest 
in April 2006, when the SEE countries agreed to transform the FTAs into a single 
agreement, by enlarging and modernizing the current Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA). Known as CEFTA 2006, the new single FTA is a modern trade 
agreement that harmonizes trade rules across the region and incorporates new 
provisions such as trade in services, intellectual property rights, public procurement and 
investment promotion. 
The overall results of SEE countries’ trade liberalization, both with the EU and with 
other countries in the region, have been positive. Over the past eight years, the Western 
Balkan countries have become increasingly integrated with the EU economy (Uvalic 
2007b). EU trade has increased faster with the SEE countries than with the rest of the 
world. The EU has become the main trading partner of all countries, accounting in 2008 
for 55–80 per cent of the Western Balkan countries’ imports and exports. The positive 
trade effects are particularly evident for countries like FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) which had no or limited EU trade preferences before 2000. However, due 
to much larger imports than exports, the SEE countries have experienced growing trade 
deficits. Insufficient restructuring and modernization of key industries due to delayed 
privatization, limited FDI in the majority of SEE countries, and rigid exchange rate 
policies leading to the real appreciation of national currencies, are among the main 
reasons for the limited competitiveness of SEE products on EU markets. 
The process of trade liberalization within the SEE region has also had a positive 
influence on regional trade. Most SEE countries have registered an increase in trade 
with other countries in the region, although the impact has been extremely uneven 
across countries (see Uvalic 2009b). The initiative has had very marginal effects in 
Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, where the EU’s much earlier trade liberalization 
measures have facilitated a major reorientation of trade primarily towards the Union. In 
contrast, regional trade for most countries of former Yugoslavia has remained an 
important part of their overall trade and intra-SEE trade liberalization has further 
stimulated its expansion.   
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In 1989, the most integrated part of the SEE region was the Yugoslav economy, and 18 
years later the successor states of the former Yugoslavia are still the more integrated 
economies in the region—a paradox, since the break-up of the Yugoslav federation, the 
imposition of trade and non-trade barriers, the multiple military conflicts of the 1990s, 
and the economic sanctions imposed on some countries, have clearly pushed in the 
opposite direction. This reconfirms that historical trade links inherited from the past are 
of fundamental importance for the Western Balkans (see Uvalic 2006). Although all the 
SEE countries have made major efforts to reorient their exports primarily towards the 
EU countries, this has often given limited results. Thus, being able to find alternative, 
more liberalized markets in the SEE region has helped their exports grow more than 
otherwise would have been the case.  
In addition to increasing trade, over the past eight years the SEE countries have become 
more integrated with the EU through other channels such as FDI and financial 
integration. The largest part, by far, of the recent FDI inflows to the SEE economies 
originates from EU countries. Western Balkan-EU integration has also taken place 
through increased integration of financial and capital markets, prompted further by 
privatization of the banking sector. As mentioned earlier, major EU multinational banks 
today own 60-95 per cent of the banking assets in Western Balkan countries. Foreign 
ownership of banks was a welcome feature in the process of bank restructuring and 
privatization, although it has recently rendered the Balkan countries more vulnerable to 
the current global economic crisis.  
In contrast to the accelerated EU-SEE economic integration, the pace of establishing 
contractual relations with the EU has been disappointing. Only two countries were able to 
sign SAAs with the EU early on: FYR Macedonia in April 2001 and Croatia in October 
2001 (see Table 8). For the other SEE countries the process has been substantially 
delayed, frequently due to very strict EU political conditionality. Albania concluded its 
SAA only in June 2006, and Montenegro in October 2007. The last two countries to sign 
an SAA were Serbia (April 2008), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (June 2008). In the case 
of Serbia, the ratification of the SAA and the application of the interim trade agreement 
were postponed for more than a year, due to its non-compliance with political conditions 
(insufficient collaboration with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia); the process was unblocked only in late December 2009.  
As a result, the SEE countries today are at very different stages of the EU integration 
process. Croatia is the only candidate presently negotiating EU membership with the 
objective of joining in 2012; FYR Macedonia is a candidate country but accession 
negotiations have not yet commenced; Montenegro and Albania have applied for 
candidate status which needs to be approved; Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia are still 
potential candidates, while Kosovo has a special status under the so-called ‘tracking 
mechanism’.6 With the exception of Croatia, the prospects of EU membership for the 
SEE countries are rather uncertain, despite promises regarding accession reconfirmed by 
the EU on various occasions. 
                                                 
6   Since 2001, the Kosovo provisional authorities under UNSCR 1244 have prioritized the 
European agenda and committed to a long term European integration process. A permanent technical 
and political dialogue with Kosovo authorities, called the SAP tracking mechanism (STM), has been 
established to provide sound policy advice and guidance to Kosovo’s reform efforts. Under the SAP 
tracking mechanism, regular meetings have been held to assess Kosovo's progress in realizing 
European partnership recommendations.   
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Table 8 
Stabilization and Association Agreements signed by the EU and the SEE countries 
Country  Date of signature Date  effective 
FYR Macedonia  9 April 2001  1 April 2004 
Croatia  29 October 2001  1 February 2005 
Albania  12 June 2006  1 April 2009 
  
Montenegro  15 October 2007  Ratification process not complete  
Serbia  29 April 2008  Ratification process not complete  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  16 June 2008  Ratification process not complete  
 
6  Understanding delays in transition in SEE 
The ongoing analysis of macroeconomic performance and transition-related economic 
reforms in the SEE countries suggests that there has been major convergence over the 
past eight years. Although some SEE countries had achieved the desired objectives 
much earlier, macroeconomic performance after 2001 has also improved in the ‘late 
reformers’ that were characterized by extreme economic instability in the 1990s. 
Similarly, many transition-related reforms have now been carried forward and 
implemented successfully in countries that were institutionally lagging behind in the 
1990s: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia. Today we observe a substantial 
reduction in the institutional differences not only among the individual SEE countries, 
but also with respect to the CEE countries.  
Yet, most Western Balkan countries today still lag behind in certain aspects of 
economic reforms, in the level of economic development, and in the EU integration 
process. One might have expected that the extent of market-oriented reforms undertaken 
in the past, which provided all of the Yugoslav successor states with initial conditions 
that were among the best within the former socialist countries, would have been a 
substantial advantage, facilitating the transition. However, most SEE countries, instead 
of being leaders among the transition countries, have turned out to be laggards (Estrin 
and Uvalic 2008). Why has not the success of CEE been replicated in the Western 
Balkans?  
There is an enormous empirical literature that tries to disentangle the role of various 
factors responsible for the diverging progress of the individual transition countries that 
considers the importance of initial conditions, policies such as privatization and 
liberalization, and institutions (see, for example, Godoy and Stiglitz 2007). Over the last 
20 years, the SEE countries have experienced very different paths of transition, but it 
seems even harder in their case to establish the determinants of variable transition paths. 
This is because there are additional factors in the SEE region that have fundamentally 
influenced the different pace and contents of transition. Three groups of factors are 
primarily considered to be responsible for the delayed attainment of some transition 
objectives in SEE:  
i)  political events,  
ii)  delayed integration with the EU, and more arguably,  
iii)  inappropriate economic policies.   
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The  political events of the early 1990s—primarily the break-up of the Yugoslav 
federation and the military conflicts accompanying it—interrupted the economic 
transition. These rendered other priorities, primarily the building of nation states, more 
important, even at the cost of military conflict, international isolation, and high 
economic instability. After the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, the pursue of 
political objectives rendered some of the objectives of the transition to market economy 
secondary. As a result, the overall political and economic conditions in the SEE region 
during the 1990s were fundamentally different than those in CEE. The legacy of the 
1990s, a decade marked by extreme political instability, left a heavy burden on most 
SEE countries, including delicate problems relating to borders, status, return of 
refugees, and minority rights. In addition, the political events of the 1990s have had 
very profound and long-term economic consequences not only on those countries that 
had to bear major responsibility for them, but for the entire SEE region. Albania and 
FYR Macedonia, although not directly involved in the Balkan military conflicts in the 
1990s,7 also experienced the negative effects of political instability in the SEE region, 
as illustrated by the limited FDI inflows, or delayed association to the EU. Despite 
major improvements in macroeconomic performance and the fast implementation of 
transition in all SEE countries after 2001, these have not been sufficient to compensate 
fully for the negative trends of the 1990s. Even after 20 years, half of the countries still 
have not attained their 1989 GDP levels.  
The second group of factors that explains the slower pace of economic transition in the 
Western Balkans is delayed integration with the EU. EU policies towards the Western 
Balkan region, particularly in the 1990s, were very different than those applied to the 
CEE countries or even other SEE countries (Bulgaria, Romania, or Slovenia). Due to 
the outbreak of war in SEE in the early 1990s, the EU failed to elaborate a longer-term 
strategy for the Western Balkans, which in turn substantially delayed their integration 
with the EU. In the early 1990s, in order to be offered substantial financial support 
through PHARE and other forms of assistance, it was sufficient for the CEE countries to 
declare their desire to implement the transition to multiparty democracy and market 
economy. Association Agreements with the EU were concluded soon thereafter, during 
1993 to 1996. The Western Balkan countries, in contrast, were not offered more 
substantial financial assistance and the possibility to conclude Association Agreements 
with the EU until the year 2000, and the whole process has been extremely slow. The 
non-fulfilment of the required conditions that have become even more numerous for the 
Balkan countries than for the CEE states, together with very strict EU political 
conditionality, has delayed the EU-Balkan integration process quite substantially, so 
that the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU was not concluded by a 
few Western Balkan countries until 2008.  
The third factor which accounts for the SEE countries’ slower transition progress is 
inappropriate economic policy, although this is somewhat more controversial. Some 
SEE countries have postponed the attainment of transition-related economic objectives 
because of exceptional political circumstances (Bosnia and Herzegovina), or because of 
the deliberate choice of a ‘gradualist’ transition strategy (FR Yugoslavia). The 
economic policies implemented in Serbia in the 1990s were often reversals of 
progressive transition-related economic reforms implemented in 1989-91, or were even 
                                                 
7   The 2001 civil war additionally destabilized the Macedonian economy, but this happened only ten 
years after Yugoslavia’s break-up.   
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a return to practices long abandoned in former Yugoslavia (Uvalic 2007a). Only more 
recently have these countries introduced more radical economic reforms, very similar to 
those implemented in the other SEE countries some years earlier.  
While the timing of transition-related economic reforms was different in the single SEE 
countries, the contents were similar, designed on the lines of the orthodox transition 
policies implemented elsewhere in CEE, and based on the recommendations of the 
Washington consensus (see Williamson 1990). The SEE-country economic policies 
have focused on liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, exchange rate stability, 
and privatization, often disregarding the negative effects of restrictive monetary policies 
for the real sector of the economy. The high monetary instability in the SEE region in 
the early 1990s, and the frequent presence of the IMF, fundamentally influenced the 
monetary policies intended to minimize inflation irrespective of the effects on growth. 
This type of policy was implemented in some SEE countries despite the fact that 
experience of excessively restrictive macroeconomic policies in certain transition 
countries, proposed as part of the ‘post-Washington’ consensus (Kolodko and Nuti 
1997: 49-52), had already indicated very high costs in terms of slower growth.  
Other important messages of the ‘post-Washington’ consensus were also mostly ignored 
in SEE (see Kolodko and Nuti 1997). The new consensus stressed the importance of the 
‘organic’ growth of the private sector through the expansion of de novo enterprises 
rather than just privatization of existing firms; the importance of corporate governance 
as opposed to a mere transfer of property titles; and recognition of the negative 
consequences of neglect or discriminatory penalization of the state sector. At a time 
when the invisible hand of the market continued to be glorified, the post-Washington 
consensus stressed the new role of the state and active government policies, not just less 
government but a different role of the government. In particular, the importance of 
industrial policy was pointed out, for example, by promoting investment in certain 
sectors, improving access to credit for small and medium enterprises, encouraging 
innovation, or in introducing and protecting quality and technical standards. 
It is precisely these areas of reform that were neglected in SEE countries. As a result, 
the process of industrial restructuring has been slow, contributing to limited 
competitiveness and insufficient export growth. Although the first decade of transition 
in CEE has produced many important lessons, mistakes from the early years were 
forgotten only too readily by the SEE countries that embarked on radical reforms much 
later, like Serbia (see Uvalic 2010). Despite strong growth since 2000, most SEE 
countries today are relatively underdeveloped: only three SEE countries had reached 
their 1989 GDP levels by 2008; they have Europe’s highest unemployment rates; and 
due to the structural weaknesses of their economies, all face very serious external 
imbalances. This rendered the SEEs particularly vulnerable to the global financial and 
economic crisis.  
In addition, there are a number of specific elements that could be criticized. The hyper-
liberal policies applied in the early 1990s in Albania and FYR Macedonia, backed by 
the IMF-supported shock therapy programmes, contained a number of fatal flaws. The 
substantial cuts in government expenditure that reduced the role of the state to a bare 
minimum had adverse consequences for certain sectors such as education or health. 
There were even greater policy failures in international protectorates such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or Kosovo, where liberalization, stabilization and privatization brought 
highly disappointing results, stable currency being the only exception. Economic  
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recovery of these war-devastated economies has been very slow, institution-building has 
taken much longer than expected, and many solutions imposed externally have been 
notorious failures; to mention one, the private pension fund in Kosovo, invested entirely 
in mutual investment funds outside the country (Bartlett 2008: 154). Judging by the low 
level of development in FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), acceleration of 
transition-related reforms since late 2000 and strong economic recovery have not been 
sufficient to alleviate the negative effects of the earlier decades. In Serbia, capacity 
restructuring constituted almost entirely of privatization, a process which has proceeded 
very slowly and has not been accompanied by other important measures, such as 
improving the regulatory environment for enterprise entry, or increasing competition 
through effective anti-trust policy (Uvalic 2010). Croatia has achieved better progress 
with regard to many reform objectives, and is the most developed among all SEE 
countries, but this is also due to its good initial position: it was the second most 
developed Yugoslav republic (after Slovenia) in 1991. Croatia still has a number of 
reforms to complete and its recent growth has been based on heavy borrowing from 
abroad, making it presently the most indebted SEE country and among those most 
severely hit by the global economic crisis.   
Some of Popov’s (2009) reflections about the lessons from the transition economies 
seem appropriate also for the SEE region. Optimal policies are context dependent: they 
depend on specific backgrounds and are different for each stage of economic 
development. There are no universal recipes, as there is more than one route to success. 
The reforms needed to stimulate growth are different and depend on the historical 
legacies. Indeed, path dependency and historical legacies have been very important for 
all the SEE countries, yet these facts have not been sufficiently taken into account in the 
policy advice offered to the region during the last 20 years.  
7 Conclusions 
By 2009, most SEE countries had successfully attained many of the economic 
objectives of the transition to market economy. The only possible exception is Kosovo, 
which is still in a rather difficult political and economic situation.8 The SEE countries 
have become more open market economies with dominant private ownership, have 
reformed many key institutions, and have liberalized their trade with the EU and with 
their neighbours. Their financial sector is dominated by foreign-owned EU banks, and 
there is an emerging stock exchange in all capital cities. Over the past eight years, the 
SEE countries have been among the fastest growing transition economies. They have 
reached substantial macroeconomic stability, have had stable or slightly appreciating 
internally convertible national currencies, have accumulated substantial foreign 
exchange reserves reducing the risk of external insolvency; privatization opportunities 
still abound and FDI has been on the upward trend, at least until mid-2008. With respect 
to a mere eight years ago, the gap regarding transition-related economic reforms within 
the SEE region between the early and late reformers, as well as between the Western 
Balkans and the CEE countries, has been greatly reduced. Strong economic integration 
                                                 
8   Kosovo declared political independence in February 2008, but by late 2009 it was still not recognized 
by the United Nations and a number of countries, including three EU member states (Cyprus, 
Romania and Spain). It is the least developed of all the SEE economies. In May 2009, it has obtained 
membership in the IMF.   
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of the SEE countries with the EU has also taken place through increasing trade flows, 
FDI, and financial integration, even though the establishment of contractual relations 
has proceeded at a much slower pace.  
During the last 20 years, the SEE countries have achieved many important transition 
objectives, but there have been a number of failures as well. Today’s low level of output 
with respect to 1989 illustrates how deeply the recession of the 1990s (and the political 
events that greatly amplified it) has affected the SEE economies, since the impacts have 
only partly been alleviated by strong economic growth after 2000. The history of very 
high and persistent inflation has led all SEE countries, some earlier and some later, to 
subscribe to the safe recipe of very restrictive monetary policies. While these policies 
were successful in reducing inflation, they have not assured longer-term economic 
development and a fast catching-up with the more developed European countries. The 
limited restructuring of many industrial sectors in most SEE economies and the failure 
to establish an appropriate institutional, regulatory and legal framework have failed to 
generate the supply response necessary for reducing unemployment and generating 
sustained economic development (Daviddi and Uvalic 2006).  
Although the EBRD in 1995 made a sharp distinction between the concepts of 
transition and economic development—with transition being defined as the process of 
establishing open market economies through institutional change, while development 
refers to the enhancement of living standards—it is clear that transition to a market 
economy has been largely motivated by the pursuit of economic development (Kekic 
1996). The systemic changes necessitated by the transition to market economy should, 
therefore, also have been a major instrument for attaining longer-term economic 
development, but this has proved more difficult to achieve in the SEE countries. 
Transition-related institutional changes implemented in a particularly unstable political 
and economic environment have not favoured fast economic development.  
There are still a number of economic tasks to be accomplished in the SEE countries, yet 
political challenges are just as important. The SEE countries need to make a major 
effort to resolve the remaining political issues, as this is in the interest of all. The EU 
should also reconfirm, in a credible way, the prospects of EU membership for the 
Western Balkan states. In order to accomplish permanent stability in the Western 
Balkans, it is essential to integrate all countries into the EU as soon as possible, not only 
economically but also politically. 
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